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The Fair Housing Act provides that it is unlawful “[t]o make, 
print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published” 
advertisements for sale or lease of real property that discriminate 
against certain protected classes of persons.1 Passed in 1968, in the 
wake of a wave of urban riots caused, in no small part, because of 
housing inequality,2 the ban on discriminatory advertising has acted as 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Political Science, Oakland University. I would like to thank my 
Mom, Dad, Gram, Popa, and the rest of my family and friends for all of their love 
and support. Additionally, special thanks are owed to Dave, Kristopher, and Lori 
Opron for their help with this Note.  
1 Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1968). 
2 A survey taken of urban minorities in 1968 by the DETROIT FREE PRESS 
revealed that the number two cause of the 12th Street Riots in Detroit, Michigan, 
was “Poor Housing.” This factor was second only to police brutality and was more 
important than poverty, lack of jobs, and six other enumerated factors. JUNE 
MANNING THOMAS, REDEVELOPMENT AND RACE: PLANNING A FINER CITY IN 
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a first line of defense against discrimination and a mitigator of the 
devastating psychological effects of public displays of racism.3  
Unfortunately, the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition against 
discriminatory advertisements has come under attack. In 1996, 
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act to protect children 
from websites that display inappropriate sexually oriented content.4 
This act aimed to limit the liability of interactive computer service 
providers that attempt to screen inappropriate and illegal user-
generated content from their websites.5 However, a misguided 
interpretation of this act made interactive computer service providers 
civilly immune as publishers and speakers of third party content, 
unlike their print media counterparts.6 Thus, a newspaper company 
has to screen its print edition for classifieds that violate the Fair 
Housing Act, but is free to post the discriminatory ads in their online 
edition. In many jurisdictions, the ultimate result has been that those 
wishing to find a place to discriminate based on race, color, religion, 
                                                                                                                   
POSTWAR DETROIT (CREATING THE NORTH AMERICAN LANDSCAPE) 130-131 (The 
Johns Hopkins University Press 1997). Additionally, a major cause of the Watts 
Riots of 1965 was the overturning of the Rumford Fair Housing Act of California, 
which mandated equality of opportunity for black home buyers. Valerie Reitman & 
Mitchell Landsberg, Watts Riots, 40 Years Later: Nine People who Were in the 
Midst of the Turmoil Recall how Six Days of Violence Changed Lives—and L.A. 
Itself, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-watts11aug11,0,7619426.story. Inequality 
of housing opportunity also played a pivotal role in the 1967 Newark Riots. Charisse 
Jones, Years Later, Lessons from Newark Riots to Be Learned USA TODAY, Nov. 
19, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-19-
riots_x.htm. 
3 For information regarding the psychological and physiological effects of 
racism see David R. Williams & Ruth Williams-Morris, Racism and Mental 
Health:The African American Experience, 5 ETHNICITY AND HEALTH 243, 243-68 
(2000); Rodney Clark, Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A 
Biopsychosocial Model, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST. 805, 805-16 (1999). 
4 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000). 
5 141 CONG. REC. H8469-H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Cox). 
6 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin are now only a mouse 
click away. 
                                                
In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. 
v. Craigslist, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that an interactive 
computer service provider is not liable for unscreened, user-generated 
content displayed on its website.7 The court held that the 
Communications Decency Act mandates that an interactive computer 
service provider may not be held civilly liable as the publisher or 
speaker of user-generated content on its service. Thus, Craigslist could 
not be held liable under the Fair Housing Act’s ban on making, 
printing, or publishing discriminatory advertisements. Additionally, 
the court held that Craigslist did not cause the discriminatory postings 
to be “made, printed, or published.” Therefore, Craigslist was not 
liable under the Fair Housing Act’s housing advertisement regulations.  
Part I of this note will provide the historical and jurisprudential 
background for the Craigslist decision. Part II will examine the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Craigslist. Part III will argue that the 
Seventh Circuit reached the incorrect result in Craigslist because the 
court misinterpreted the Communications Decency Act and 
overlooked that Craigslist should have been liable under the Fair 
Housing Act for “making the discriminatory advertisements, 
notwithstanding Communications Decency Act immunity. Finally, Part 
IV argues that the court was incorrect to imply that public policy 
dictates that interactive computer service provider should be treated 











7 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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A. The Fair Housing Act. 
 
In June 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. proclaimed, “[I]njustice 
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”8 Dr. King explained that if 
injustice was to be defeated, America must set out to eliminate not 
only its overt manifestations but also its “subtle and hidden forms” 
such as “housing discrimination.”9 
In reaction to the assassination of Dr. King10 and the plight of 
urban minorities, President Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968. Title VII of that act, commonly known as the Fair 
Housing Act,11 sought “to provide, within constitutional limitations, 
for fair housing throughout the United States.”12 Congress intended 
this act to “alter the whole character of the housing market.”13  
Section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act prohibits the use of 
discriminatory housing advertisements. This ban is crucial to 
Congress’ goal of eliminating housing discriminations because it 
mitigates the harmful psychological effects of public displays of 
racism14 by making it illegal for sellers to announce their intent to 
discriminate. The pertinent part of the Fair Housing Act states that it is 
illegal: 
 
To make, print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or 
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that 
                                                 
8 Dr. Martin Luther King, Speech at the Great March on Detroit (June 23, 
1963) (transcript and audio recording available at 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/%5C~PUBLIC/civilrights/a0121.html). 
9 Id. 
10 Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History And 
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 160 (1968-1969) (identifying that Dr. King’s 
assassination encouraged the passage of the bill). 
11 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 note (2000). 
12 42 U.S.C. § 3601. 
13 Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
14 See, Williams, supra note 3. 
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indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national 
origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or 
discrimination.15 
 
Additionally, reflecting Congress’ intent to create a broad prohibition, 
the Fair Housing act provides that it is also illegal to cause 
discriminatory advertisements to be made, printed, or published.16  
Courts have uniformly acknowledged that the test for determining 
whether a notice, statement, or advertisement violates § 3604(c) of the 
Fair Housing Act is whether it would indicate to an ordinary reader a 
discriminatory preference or limitation prohibited by the statute.17 
Where this objective test is met, a plaintiff need not establish that the 
advertisement was made with a discriminatory intent.18 
Moreover, Congress designed § 3604(c) using broad, sweeping 
language so it could be applied to “any publishing medium.”19 Thus, 
the ban on discriminatory advertising has been enforced in a wide 
variety of circumstances, including: newspaper advertisements,20 oral 
statements,21 signs,22 telecommunication devices for the deaf,23 
                                                 
15 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added). 
17 Jancik v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that it is uniformly accepted that because the Fair Housing Act prohibits 
advertisements that indicate a discriminatory preference, courts should employ an 
objective, ordinary reader standard, notwithstanding the subjective intent of the 
author); Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Dist. 1991) (citing 
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972)); see also Spann v. 
Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (utilizing an analogous 
reasonable reader standard). 
18 Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556; Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999. 
19 Hunter, 459 F.2d at 210-11. 
20 Id. at 210. 
21 Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556-557 (holding that oral statements can violate 
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act). 
22 Fair Hous. Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1291-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
23 United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 419-421 (2d Cir. 2005). 
156 
5
Opron: License to Kill (the Dream of Fair Housing): How the Seventh Circ
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
racially restrictive covenants recorded by a recorder of deeds,24 and 
even visual advertisements with racially suggestive themes.25  
However, the internet has become a devastating exception that 
threatens to render the Fair Housing Act ineffective. The 
Communications Decency Act has been inappropriately interpreted by 
numerous courts as precluding an interactive computer service 
provider from being considered a publisher or speaker of information 
provided by a third party. Thus, interactive computer service providers 
currently have no risk of liability under the Fair Housing Act’s ban on 
the publishing of discriminatory advertisements. At a time when the 
internet has emerged as a dominant and rapidly growing force in the 
real estate industry,26 this could prove to be a fatal blow to Congress’ 
goal of a discrimination free housing market.  
 
B. The Communications Decency Act 
 
In order to modernize an antiquated telecommunications 
regulatory scheme, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 
1996. Section 230 of Title V of the Communications Decency Act 
aimed to protect interactive computer service providers “who take[] 
steps to screen indecent[] and offensive material for their customers.” 
27 This section states in pertinent part: 
 
SEC. 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING 
AND SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL 
 
                                                 
24 Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
25 Tyus v. Robin Constr. Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2791, 9-10 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 4, 1993).  
26 Sam Diaz, On the Internet, A Tangled Web Of Classified Ads With So Many 
Sites, Sifting Is Difficult, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 31, 2007, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/30/AR2007083002046.html?hpid=sec-tech. 
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c. Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening 
of offensive material. 
 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
 
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on account of (A) any 
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action 
taken to enable or make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
material described in paragraph (1).28 
 
For the purposes of this act, the term interactive computer 
service means: 
 
any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a 
service or system that provides access to the Internet and 
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or 
educational institutions.29  
 
Furthermore, an information content provider is defined as “any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
                                                 
28 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000) 
29 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
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or development of information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service.”30  
There is no dispute that Craigslist, as a website operator, falls 
under the statutory definition of an interactive computer service. 
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the third party visitors to 
Craigslist’s fall under the statutory definition of information content 
provider. Thus, the issue lies in the effects of the statute’s provisions, 
not the applicability of the parties to its effects.  
Section 230(c)(1) immunity began to take shape in Zeran v. 
America Online.31 In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit considered the appeal 
of a customer of America Online who alleged that America Online: (1) 
unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by 
third parties about him on America Online’s website, (2) wrongfully 
refused to post a retraction of those messages, and (3) failed to screen 
for future third-party-created defamatory messages.32 The Fourth 
Circuit held that “[b]y its plain language, § 230 creates a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the 
service. . .and precludes courts from entertaining claims that would 
place a computer service provider in a publisher's role.”33 
Furthermore, the Zeran court stated that the purpose of the 
Communications Decency Act was to minimize the threat that tort-
based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech on the internet.34 Thus, the 
                                                 
30 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
31 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
32 Id. at 328. 
33 Id. at 330. 
34 Id. The court assembled sparse comments made by Congresspersons about 
reducing government involvement in the regulation of inappropriate content on the 
internet. Id. However, the court failed to identify that this was not a call for free 
speech on the internet, but rather an attack on the Exon Amendment to the same bill 
that planned to use public rather than private forms of enforcement. For an overview 
of the Exon Amendment, see Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator 
Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information 
Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 57-64 (1996). 
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court held that the customer could not successfully maintain a 
negligence suit against America Online.35  
 The Zeran interpretation of § 230(c)(1) was largely accepted by 
the other federal circuit courts of appeals36 until the Seventh Circuit 
challenged the interpretation in Doe v. GTE Corp.37 In Doe, a group of 
varsity athletes alleged that hidden cameras were placed in their locker 
rooms, and videos of them were sold online.38 One of the parties 
named in the suit was the webhost, GTE Corporation (“GTE”).39 In 
considering potential liability for GTE’s role in the case, Judge 
Easterbrook provided, in dicta, two possible interpretations of the 
Communications Decency Act.40 First, he suggested that § 230(c)(1) 
could be read as a “definitional clause.”41 Thus, “an entity would 
remain a ‘provider or user’—and thus be eligible for the immunity 
under § 230(c)(2)—as long as the information came from somewhere 
else; but it would become a ‘publisher or speaker’ and lose the benefit 
of § 230(c)(2) if it created the objectionable information.”42 Second, 
Judge Easterbrook stated that “perhaps § 230(c)(1) forecloses any 
liability that depends on deeming the ISP a ‘publisher.’”43 However, 
the court ultimately decided that § 230(c) liability was not implicated 
in Doe and left the decision for another day.44 That day finally came in 
2008 when Craigslist came before the Seventh Circuit. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. 
36 See Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 
(10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Batzel 
v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).  
37 347 F.3d 655, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003). 
38 Id. at 656. 
39 Id. 




44 Id. at 660. 
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II. CHICAGO LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, 
INC. V. CRAIGSLIST, INC. 
 
A. District Court 
 
“NO MINORITIES,” “only Muslims,” and “no children” are 
among the discriminatory messages contained in over 120 housing 
advertisements posted on Craigslist, Inc.’s website from July, 2005 to 
January 2006.45 These discriminatory advertisements formed the 
inspiration for the complaint filed by Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. (“CLCCRUL”). CLCCRUL is a non-
profit consortium of Chicago law firms that provides free legal 
services in civil rights cases, including those involving the Fair 
Housing Act.46 The defendant, Craigslist, Inc. (“Craigslist”), is a 
Delaware Corporation, whose business is founded upon its operation 
of a network of websites that facilitate advertising for a wide array of 
goods and services, including the sale and rent of housing.47  
The CLCCRUL’s primary motivation for bringing suit was to seek 
a declaratory judgment that Craigslist, Inc.’s violated § 3601 of the 
Fair Housing Act.48 Additionally, the CLCCRUL asked the court to 
enjoin Craigslist from continuing to publish discriminatory 
advertisement and require that Craigslist take necessary precautions to 
screen for discriminatory advertisements.49 The CLCCRUL suggested 
that the court require Craigslist to adopt a publicly displayed anti-
                                                 
45 Complaint, Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. 
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discrimination policy50 and employ computerized screening 
software.51  
Craigslist argued that CLCCRUL’s complaint failed on the 
pleadings because Craigslist had immunity under §230(c)(1) of the 
Communications Decency Act.52 The District Court granted 
Craigslist’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.53 The court agreed 
with the defendant that the Communications Decency Act barred the 
defendants from being found liable for posting discriminatory user-
generated content.54 The court reached this conclusion by utilizing its 
interpretation of the plain language of § 230(c)(1).55 The court rejected 
the holding of Zeran because it “overstates the ‘plain language’ of 
§ 230(c)(1)” by announcing a broad immunity for claims against 
information content providers based on third-party content, 
irrespective of whether the claims involve liability as a publisher or 
speaker.56 Instead, the court found that the plain language of the bill 
only prohibits an interactive computer service provider from being 
held civilly liable as a publisher of third party content.57 The court 
stated that it was not important to determine if Congress intended the 
Communications Decency Act to apply outside the context of 
defamation suits.58 Instead, it was sufficient that the the plain language 
                                                 
50 To its credit, Craigslist now has an anti-discrimination policy that is 
displayed on its website, available at  http://www.craigslist.org/about/FHA.  
51 Complaint, Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 461 F.Supp2d 681, 698-99 (N.D. ILL. 2006) (No. 06 C 0657). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 698. 
56 Id. at 693-94. 
57 Id. at 696. 
58 As discussed below in Part III(A)(2), Congress expressly intended to 
legislatively overturn a line of defamation cases including Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.), wherein courts held that treated 
interactive computer service providers as publishers because they tried to screen and 
restrict access to objectionable material on their sites.  
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was not at odds with Congress’ intent.59 The court stated that its plain 
language reading was “at least as harmonious with congressional 
intent” as the readings proffered by Craigslist and the CLCCRUL.60 
Thus, the court found that its interpretation was proper and the 
CLCCRUL was thus precluded from bringing its claim against 
Craigslist as a publisher of the allegedly discriminatory 
advertisements.61  
The District Court also briefly considered whether Craigslist 
could be found liable under one of the Fair Housing Act’s other 
prohibitions involving discriminatory housing advertisements.62 The 
court found that Craigslist did not make the discriminatory 
advertisements because they originated from users of Craigslist’s 
website.63 Furthermore, the court found that Craigslist did not print 
the discriminatory advertisements because when the statute was 
drafted, the plain meaning of the term print did not encompass 
computer based reproduction.64 Thus, the court held that Craigslist 
could not be found liable under any of the Fair Housing Act’s 
prohibitions against discriminatory 65 advertisements.   
                                                
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant 
of judgment on the pleadings.66 First, the court found that the 
Communications Decency Act barred the defendants from being found 
liable as the “publisher or speaker” of the user-provided content posted 
 
59 Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 461 F.Supp2d 681, 696-97 (N.D. ILL. 2006) (N.D. ILL. 2006). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 698-99. 




66Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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on its website.67 Second, the court held that Craigslist was not liable 
under the Fair Housing Act for causing the advertisement to be made, 
printed, or published.68 Finally, albeit in dictum, the court posited that 
several public policy considerations called for granting interactive 
computer service providers immunity for civil claims involving user-
provided content.69  
Although § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act is regularly enforced 
against newspapers and other publishers,70 the Seventh Circuit held 
that § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act precludes 
aggrieved parties’ ability to “sue the messenger” when the messenger 
is an interactive computer service provider.71 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court rejected both the CLCCRUL’s and Craigslist’s 
proposed interpretations of § 230(c)(1).72 
 The CLCCRUL advanced the position that § 230(c)(1) is 
applicable only to interactive computer service providers that engage 
in some sort of filtering, blocking, or screening of published 
information.73 It posited that § 230(c)(1) should be interpreted in light 
of the section’s title: “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material.”74 The CLCCRUL stated that this 
narrower interpretation was necessitated by § 230(c)(2)’s focus on 
limiting civil liability for those who filter or screen objectionable 
material.75 It argued that nothing in § 230’s text or history suggested 
that Congress meant to immunize an information service provider 
from liability under the Fair Housing Act.76 Furthermore, there was no 
evidence that Congress even remotely contemplated discriminatory 
                                                 
67 Id. at 671. 
68 Id. at 671-72. 
69 Id. at 668-69. 
70 Id. at 668. 
71 Id. at 672. 
72 Id. at 669-70. 
73 Id. at 669. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 672. 
76 Id. at 671. 
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housing advertisements when it passed §230.77 Conversely, Craigslist 
interpreted §230(c)(1) to provide interactive computer service 
providers with comprehensive civil liability from information posted 
on their services, notwithstanding any efforts to screen or block 
objectionable or illegal information.78 
However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
opinion that §230(c)(1) neither grants broad based immunity nor limits 
immunity to interactive computer service providers that screen 
objectionable and illegal information.79 By engaging in what the court 
called a natural reading of § 230(c)(1), it held that “an online 
information system must not ‘be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by’ someone else.”80 The court held that this 
precluded Craigslist from being held liable as a publisher or speaker of 
the allegedly discriminatory advertisements under the Fair Housing 
Act’s ban on “publishing” discriminatory housing advertisements.81  
The court also considered the CLCCRUL’s alternative contention 
that Craigslist could also be found in violation of §3604(c) of the Fair 
Housing Act because it caused discriminatory advertisements “to be 
made, printed, or published.”82 The court admitted that Craigslist 
played a causal role in the publishing of the discriminatory 
advertisement.83 It explained that “no one could post a discriminatory 
ad if craigslist did not offer a forum.”84 However, the court held that 
this causal link was insufficiently proximate.85 It insisted that 
“[c]ausation in a statute such as §3604(c) must refer to causing a 
particular statement to be made, or perhaps the discriminatory content 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 672. 
79 Id. at 669. 
80 Id. at 671. 
81 Id. at 672. 






Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
of a statement.”86 The court held that an idle publisher cannot be one 
who causes a statement to be made.87 Therefore, the court held that 
Craigslist could not be found to have the requisite causal relationship 
under §3604(c) because the record did not show that it offered any 
inducement for anyone to post discriminatory advertisements.88 
Finally, Chief Judge Easterbrook spent a substantial portion of the 
opinion providing dictum on the public policy reasons for absolving 
Craigslist of liability as a publisher or speaker.89 First, Chief Judge 
Easterbrook argued that online services are not analogous to 
newspaper classifieds, against which courts regularly enforce §3604(c) 
of the Fair Housing Act.90 Without elaboration, the court admitted that 
online services share some common characteristics as a classified 
section of a newspaper.91 The court then compared online service 
providers to both telephone services and courier services such as 
FedEx and UPS.92 Without further explanation, the court proclaimed 
that craigslist neither made nor published any information transmitted 
through its service.93 Thus, the court implied that interactive computer 
service providers should not be held to the same standard as 
newspapers.94 
Second, the court suggested that the screening of user-generated-
content may raise first amendment issues.95 The court noted that 
§ 3603(b)(1) of the Fair Housing Act allows owners of single-family 
homes who do not own more than three single-family homes to 
discriminate against the otherwise protected classes of people for 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 671-72. 
89 Id. at 668-69. 
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whatever reason during the sale of their property.96 However, the court 
recognized that this exemption does not apply to discriminatory 
advertisements under § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act.97 Despite its 
recognition, the court argued that “any rule that forbids truthful 
advertising of a transaction that would be substantively lawful 
encounters serious problems under the first amendment.”98  
Third, the court argued that the screening of user-generated 
content may not be effective.99 First, the court stated that simple word 
filters would not work.100 For example, a simple filter would block 
color words such as white or black that may or may not be racially 
descriptive.101 Second, the court argued that human reviewers may be 
equally poor at filtering out violative advertisements from legally 
permissible posts.102  
Finally, the court stated that screening postings would be 
economically inefficient for craigslist.103 The court argued that 
requiring Craigslist to screen its nearly 30 million posts per month 
would be prohibitively expensive because the posts would have to be 
reviewed by Craigslist’s staff of fewer than 30 employees.104 Thus, 
either Craigslist would have to increase its staff, and therefore, its 
operating costs, or accept a long delay in posting time which would 








99 Id. at 668-69. 
100 Id. at 669. 
101 Id. at 668-69. 
102 Id. at 669. 
103 Id. at 668-69. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 669. 
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN CRAIGSLIST BY MISINTERPRETING 
THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND INCORRECTLY HOLDING 
THAT CRAIGSLIST DID NOT FALL UNDER THE COVERAGE OF THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT. 
 
This section argues that Craigslist should have been held liable 
under the Fair Housing Act for its role in the discriminatory housing 
advertisements at issue. First, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly declared 
blanket immunity for interactive computer service providers posting 
user generated content. Second, the court could have alternatively 
found Craigslist liable under the Fair Housing Act as one who made 
the discriminatory advertisements. 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit erred by basing its holding on a 
misinterpretation of the Communications Decency Act 
 
In Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit killed the dream of a 
discrimination-free housing market. And worse, it did so by utilizing 
an anachronistic textualist method of statutory interpretation. The 
court viewed the Communications Decency Act as if it were drafted in 
a vacuum, devoid of historical and jurisprudential context and 
legislative history. The following sections seek to illuminate the errors 
of the court’s use of this short-sighted mode of statutory interpretation. 
Part 1 of this section begins, as all proper statutory interpretation 
should, by analyzing the text of the Communications Decency Act. 
Next, Part 2 puts the text of the statute in its proper context by 
identifying the legislative history of the Act. Finally, Part 3 applies this 
foundational material to prevailing canons of statutory interpretation to 
reveal that the Communications Decency Act precludes civil liability 
only where an interactive computer service provider screens its site for 
inappropriate and illegal material.  
 
1. Textual Analysis of the Communications Decency Act 
 
Although an examination of a statute’s text is not an end in and of 
itself, it is the proper starting point for statutory interpretation. This 
168 
17
Opron: License to Kill (the Dream of Fair Housing): How the Seventh Circ
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
section argues that under a thorough textual analysis of the 
Communications Decency Act, an interactive computer service 
provider would be precluded from being treated as the publisher 
and/or speaker of user-generated content for the purposes of civil 
liability only where: (1) the information being presented was 
generated by a third party, and (2) the provider makes efforts to screen 
objectionable and illegal material. 
 For a case of such magnitude, that put the civil rights of so many 
in the balance, Craigslist’s textual analysis is contemptuously short. 
Section 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.” The 
court held that because “[S]ubsection (c)(2) does not deal with the 
liability of speakers and publishers” it read § 230(c)(1) as an 
autonomous provision. Craigslist held that “[a] natural reading of 
§ 230(c)(1)” precluded an interactive computer service provider from 
being held liable as a publisher or speaker of third party content, 
notwithstanding any attempts to filter inappropriate or illegal 
material.106 However, nowhere in the opinion does the court explain 
why its reading is a natural reading, nor does it affirmatively refute 
why other possible readings are inferior.  
Despite the court’s silence, there is another plausible and more 
logical interpretation of § 230. The whole act rule is a common rule of 
statutory interpretation utilized by proponents of virtually every 
doctrine of statutory interpretation. It provides that “Statutory 
construction. . .is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem 
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the 
statutory scheme. . .because only one of the permissible meanings 
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the 
law.”107 
 To apply the whole act rule, it is pertinent to identify each of the 
Communications Decency Act’s components. The title of the 
                                                 
106 Id. at 670-671. 
107 United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988). 
169 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
Communications Decency Act reads, “PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE 
BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL.”108 
An ordinary reader would expect that the material under such a 
heading would be qualified by or directly related to the protection for 
private blocking and screening of offensive material. Moreover, this 
assumption is strengthened by the title of § 230(c) that reads, 
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive 
material.”109 Next, § 230(c)(1), the portion of the statute at issue in 
Craigslist, states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” 
Finally, § 230(c)(2) outlines the civil liability for providers of an 
interactive computer service that “restrict access to … obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable” material.110  
 When the whole act rule is applied to the Communications 
Decency Act, it is apparent that the court should have accepted the 
CLCCRUL’s interpretation of the text of the Act. First, it would be 
illogical to assume that Congress intended to place a wholly 
independent clause in the middle of an act whose title, subsection title 
and other provision all share the common theme of screening of 
offensive material. Second, the effect of such a reading is inconsistent 
with the text of the other sections. The other sections of the 
Communications Decency Act make a quid-pro-quo offer of legal 
protection in return for interactive computer service provider’s 
screening of certain material.111 The government’s consideration in 
this bargain is forfeited if § 230(c)(1) is interpreted, as it was by 
Craigslist, as offering this protection up for free. Although it is 
possible that this was the Congress’s intent, it is certainly more logical 
to assume that, given the text surrounding § 230(c)(1) the government 
                                                 
108 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). 
109 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
110 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
111 This is evidenced by the operative word for, which appears in both the title 
of § 230 and § 230 (c). 
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intended to get its part of the legislative bargain. Thus, taken together, 
§ 230(c)(1) should be read to apply to interactive computer service 
providers only when they engage in screening of offensive material. 
As illustrated in the background section of this Note, the 
CLCCRUL’s principal complaint with Craigslist’s behavior was that 
Craigslist did not engage in any type of screening for the 
discriminatory housing classifieds that were being posted on its site. 
Because a proper textual analysis would hold that Craigslist would 
only be precluded from civil liability as a publisher or speaker when it 
screens offensive and illegal material, the court should have held that 
Craigslist was in violation of the Fair Housing Act. However, a 
statutory interpretation that considers only the text of a statute is short-
sighted because it presumes that a legislature was perfect in 
articulating its desires through the language it used. Because this is an 
unrealistic presumption, it is pertinent that a statutory analysis 
consider contextual evidence such as legislative history.  
Moreover, even unapologetic proponents of textualism, who 
adamantly devalue the weight of legislative history, recognize that in 
some instances there is value in examining legislative history to aid in 
interpreting the meaning of an ambiguous statute. 112 As textualism 
proponent Judge Easterbrook wrote in In re Sinclair, “[c]larity 
depends on context, which legislative history may illuminate. The 
process is objective; the search is not for the contents of the authors’ 
heads but for the rules of language they used.”113 In the instant case, 
there is ambiguity as to which rules of language Congress used in 
drafting the Communications Decency Act. The court’s interpretation 
states that a § 230(c)(1) is a stand-alone sentence that is properly 
interpreted notwithstanding the surrounding text and title of the act. 
Conversely, CLCCRUL’s position posited that the drafters intended to 
qualify § 230(c)(1) with the surrounding text and title of the act. 
Although, as demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, the 
                                                 
112 See Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (proclaiming that where a statute produces an absurd result, it is 
“entirely appropriate to consult all public materials” including the background of a 
rule and its legislative history). 
113 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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CLCCRUL’s textual interpretation is logically superior to the court’s 
interpretation, there exists a genuine question of linguistic 
construction. Thus, as even Chief Justice Easterbrook’s prior holding 
dictates, this ambiguity should be resolved by an examination of the 
legislative history of the Act. 
 
2. Legislative History of the Communications Decency Act 
 
Legislative history114 is commonly regarded as the focal point of 
traditional Anglo-American theories of statutory interpretation.115 
Furthermore, despite attempts by textualists to virtually eliminate the 
role of legislative history in statutory interpretation, a majority of 
commentators remain champions of the modes of interpretation that 
highlight legislative intent.116 In the instant case, the legislative history 
of the Communications Decency Act provides support for the position 
that the Act was meant to apply to an interactive computer service 
provider only when it takes an affirmative effort to screen illegal and 
offensive material from its websites. 
The Cox-Wyden amendment to Title V of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 became § 230(c) of the 
Communications Decency Act. This amendment was inspired by what 
congress felt was an unjust result in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Co.117 Thus, it is pertinent to consider the Prodigy decision. 
                                                 
114 For the purposes of this note, the term legislative history will utilize its 
commonly accepted definition: “the internal legislative pre-history of a statute – the 
internal institutional progress of a bill to enactment and the deliberation 
accompanying that progress.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 971-72 (4th ed. 
2007). 
115 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
221 (2d ed. 2006). 
116 See Eskridge, supra note 115, at 990. 
117 141 CONG. REC. H8469-H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Cox) (expressing discontent at increased liability for Prodigy because it took 
affirmative steps to screen material in violation of its terms of use). 
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In Prodigy, a securities investment banking firm, Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc., brought claims against Prodigy Services Company 
(“Prodigy”) for per se libel, among other things.118 The main issue 
before the Prodigy court was whether Prodigy was a publisher of 
allegedly libelous statements posted by third party users on Prodigy’s 
popular electronic message board, Money Talk”119 The finding of 
Prodigy as a publisher rather than a mere distributor of third party 
information was central to Stratton Oakmont’s defamation claims 
because one who repeats or otherwise republishes a libel is subject to 
liability as if he had originally published it.120 However, one who 
merely relays a libel is liable only if they knew or had reason to know 
of the libelous statements.121 Thus, the court set out to determine if 
Prodigy exercised enough editorial control over its computer bulletin 
board to render it a publisher, and thus, subject it to the same editorial 
responsibilities as a newspaper. 122 
The court found that Prodigy was a publisher of its users’ content 
because it: (1) held itself out to the public and its members as 
controlling the content of its bulletin boards, and (2) implemented 
control over the boards by utilizing technology and manpower to 
delete offensive postings.123 The court explained that Prodigy would 
not have been held liable as a publisher but for these affirmative steps 
to control the content of its bulletin board.124 The court justified this 
position by placing Prodigy’s decision to monitor its board within the 
framework of free-market economic theory.125 The court presumed 
                                                 
118 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 
(N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1995). 
119 The statements at issue in Prodigy included accusations that Stratton 
Oakmont had committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with the initial 
public offering of stock of Solomon-Page Ltd. Id.  
120 Id. at *3. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at *4. 
124 Id. at *5. 
125 Id. Free-market economic theory generally posits that it is preferable to 
conduct economic activity through voluntary private exchange rather than 
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that Prodigy screened the content of its bulletin boards in order to 
profit over its competitors by becoming a more family-oriented 
service, not for altruistic reasons.126 Thus, the court stated that Prodigy 
must also face the legal consequences of its screening.127 In Prodigy, 
this meant that Prodigy was liable as a publisher for the allegedly 
libelous statements.128 
In response to Prodigy, Rep. Christopher Cox, co-sponsor of the 
Cox-Wyden amendment that became § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, stated that the amendment would take measures to make 
sure that good samaritan screening would be rewarded rather than 
being punished.129 Impliedly unconvinced by Prodigy’s free-market 
solution, Cox stated that the amendment would “protect computer 
Good Samaritans, online service providers, [and] anyone. . .who takes 
steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their customers. . 
.from taking on liability. . .that they should not face. . .for helping us 
solve this problem.” 130 Thus, Cox sought to make a deal with private 
companies. He saw the bill as an exchange of immunity from liability 
in situations such as Prodigy where interactive computer service 
providers, such as Prodigy, are willing to take an active role in 
screening “things not only prohibited by law, but prohibited by 
parents.”131 This incentive based approach stands in direct contrast to 
Prodigy’s free-market approach and Craigslist’s interpretation of 
                                                                                                                   
government intervention. See, MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 
(1968). For a compelling and detailed critique free-market economic theory see 
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 35 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that “[i]t should need no elaboration 
that a process of undirected change. . .should be slowed down, if possible, so as to 
safeguard the welfare of the community”). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at *4. 
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§ 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act because neither of 
them provide incentive to undertake the costly process of screening. 
Other members of Congress also echoed their support for Cox’s 
vision of the bill. Representative Pat Danner stated that she strongly 
supported the efforts taken “to address the problem of children having 
untraceable access through on-line computer services to inappropriate 
and obscene pornographic materials available on the Internet.”132 
Similarly, Rep. Robert Goodlatte praised the amendment because it 
“removes the liability of providers such as Prodigy who currently 
make a good faith effort to edit the smut from their systems. It also 
encourages the online services industry to develop new technology, 
such as blocking software, to empower parents to monitor and control 
the information their kids can access.”133  
Additionally, Cox stated that the bill will “establish as the policy 
of the United States that we do not. . .wish to have a Federal Computer 
Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the Internet.” Id. 
Although this statement resembles laissez-faire, free-market rhetoric, 
it should not be read to imply that Cox would have accepted the 
Craigslist court’s position that the plain meaning § 230(c)(1) of the 
Communications Decency Act, granting publishers and speakers 
immunity notwithstanding their efforts to screen inappropriate 
material, is consistent with the intent of Congress. The court’s reading 
of § 230(c)(1) creates a disincentive for publishers or speakers to 
engage in screening of public material much like the way the Prodigy 
court’s free-market prescription to the problem of liability for libelous 
statements did. Under the Prodigy free-market approach, an interactive 
computer service provider that screens is considered a publisher for 
purposes of liability. Similarly, under the Craigslist court’s 
interpretation of § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, an 
interactive computer service provider always has civil liability for 
publishing third party content. Thus, there is no incentive to engage in 
costly screening efforts.  As noted above, Congress explicitly rejected 
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this type of prescription in favor of a more incentive-based solution 
which offers immunity in return for screening. 
In sum, the legislative history of the Communications Decency 
Act supports the CLCCRUL’s reading of § 230(c)(1). Although there 
is an ambiguity in the text of that section, the legislative history shows 
that CLCCRUL was correct to suppose that Congress intended 
§ 230(c)(1) was to be read in light of the surrounding provisions. Thus, 
an interactive computer service provider should only be offered 
immunity under that section of the Communications Decency Act only 
where it takes affirmative efforts to screen illegal and offensive 
material from its services. 
 
        3. Analysis 
 
The section above detailed substantial support from the text and 
legislative history of the Communications Decency Act for the 
position that the Act’s § 230(c)(1) immunity applies only to interactive 
computer service providers that screen for offense material. This 
section applies familiar principals of statutory interpretation to this 
evidence to demonstrate why the Act’s immunity should be so limited.  
First, it is pertinent to recognize that the Communications 
Decency Act is wholly devoid of any mention of the Fair Housing Act, 
civil rights, or any other federal laws.134 In Craigslist, Chief Judge 
Easterbrook admitted that “Congress did not even remotely 
contemplate discriminatory housing advertisements when it passed 
§ 230.”135 Moreover, the court noted that “nothing in § 230's text or 
history suggests that Congress meant to immunize an interactive 
computer service providers from liability under the Fair Housing 
Act.”136  
At this point in the court’s analysis, it would have been proper for 
Chief Judge Easterbrook to acknowledge the familiar rule against 
                                                 
134 Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, 
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repeals by implication which states that “Congress does not create 
discontinuities in legal rights and obligations without some clear 
statement.”137 In Craigslist, the court’s interpretation of the 
Communications Decency Act has left § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing 
Act fragmented despite absence of any evidence of framer’s intent to 
do so.138 Once a universally broad statute,139 applying to “any 
publishing medium,”140 it is now powerless against interactive 
computer service providers that are distinguishable only because their 
information can be found on internet rather than in paper-based or 
verbal forms. Therefore, applying the rule against repeals by 
implication, the court should have held that the CDA does not 
fragment the coverage of the Fair Housing Act by giving a free pass to 
interactive computer service providers who do not engage in screening 
for offensive material. To not follow this principle of statutory 
interpretation would beg the absurd result that a newspaper company 
would be required to screen classified housing advertisements for its 
print edition but could publish discriminatory advertisements free from 
liability in its online edition.  
Notwithstanding this illogical result, the court held that Congress’ 
silence regarding the Fair Housing Act was inconsequential.141 The 
court declared that in order to exclude the Fair Housing Act from the 
reach of § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, Congress 
must have explicitly stated that it was excluded.142 In support, the 
court cited the rule that “Congress need not think about a subject for a 
law to affect it; effects of general rules continue unless limited by 
                                                 
137 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989). See also Green v. Bock 
Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1989). 
138 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671. 
139 The Fair Housing Act explicitly states that its purpose is “to provide, within 
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3601 (2000). 
140 U.S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1972). 
141 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671. 
142 Id. at 671. 
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superseding enactments.”143 The court reasoned that the 
Communications Decency Act is a general statue because of Congress’ 
use of the word “information” in §230(c)(1).144 The court recognized 
that the impetus of the statute was to protect interactive computer 
service providers, like Prodigy, from being punished for good 
samaritan screening of inappropriate content.145 However, it argued 
that by utilizing the word “information” instead of expressly 
indentifying what types of information the Communications Decency 
Act covers, the Act was intended to have a general application.146 
Thus, the court interpreted Communications Decency Act to apply to 
the Fair Housing Act despite Congress’ silence on the subject.147 
The Craigslist court failed to consider that congress expressly 
stated the Communications Decency Act’s intended effect on other 
laws in § 230(e) of the Communications Decency Act. 148 In Section 
§ 230(e)(3), the court identified the statute’s intended effect on state 
law by stating, “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability 
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with 
this section” However, nowhere does the statute make note of its 
intended effect on inconsistent federal law. Where the legislature is 
silent regarding the effect legislation will have on a legal rule, there is 
a presumption that a prior legal rule should be retained.149 Congress 
was silent regarding the Fair Housing Act. Thus, it is proper to 
                                                 
143 Id. (citing a descriptive parenthetical from Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-127 (1974). 




148 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2000).  
149 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S.Ct. 1534, 1541 (2007) 
(holding that there is a presumption that a prior legal rule should be retained if no 
one in legislative deliberation even mentioned the rule); Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 
583, 587 (1d Cir. 1986) (stating that where the legislature is silent regarding a 
particular effect of a bill, the bill should not be read to effect a reversal of the long-
standing principles governing an area of law because “[s]uch a reversal would surely 
have been noted in the congressional discussions.”). 
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interpret the Communications Decency Act to not impact the allegedly 
inconsistent, well-settled Fair Housing Act. 
The Craigslist court offered an alternative basis for ignoring the 
supportive legislative history and textual construction of the 
Communications Decency Act. The court argued that although the 
impetus of the statute was to protect interactive computer service 
providers who screen offensive content, “[o]nce the legislative process 
gets rolling, interest groups seek (and often obtain) other 
provisions.”150 Thus, the court implied that Congress changed its goals 
for the Communications Decency Act to offer immunity to all 
interactive computer service providers notwithstanding any effort to 
screen offensive material. 
 Although interest groups play a regrettably prevalent role in our 
legislative process, the court was hasty to imply that this is the only 
possible explanation for the wording of § 230(c)(1).151 In fact, it is 
also common to our legislative process that the legislature makes 
mistakes and simply drafts poorly worded bills.152 Furthermore, al
less likely, sheer laziness on behalf of the drafters of the Cox-Wyd
amendment could account for their choice to use the word information 
instead of including every possible type of inappropriate or illegal 
material. Finally, the drafters could have presumed that the use of the 
broad term “information” would not be problematic as it was quite 
obvious by the legislative history and the statutory construction of the 
amendment that it was intended to be applied to offensive material.
beit 
en 
                                                
153 
Each of these explanations for Congress’ word choice is superior to 
the court’s explanation because the court’s explanation is mere 
conjecture. There is nothing in the legislative history that suggests 
 
150 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671. 
151 Although the court may have had another explanation, it failed to articulate 
it in Craigslist.  
152 Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (noting that if the words 
of a statute were given their plain meaning, the statute would necessitate an 
unconstitutional result). 
153 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (expressly identifying 
types of “offensive material” such as that which is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable”); See also supra Part III(a)(2). 
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interest group lobbying for favorable provisions, nor is there any 
mention whatsoever of affording any type of immunity to online 
service providers who do not provide the public with good samaritan 
screening. Absent such evidence, there is no reason to accept the 
court’s argument that any lobbying took place that changed Congress’ 
intended application of the Act. 
Finally, an ambiguous statute should not be interpreted to restrict 
rights granted by a prior statute unless restricting those rights is 
necessary to execute the new statute’s purpose. As stated above, the 
purpose of the Communications Decency Act was to encourage 
interactive computer service providers to screen objectionable material 
by offering them civil immunity as a publisher or speaker when they 
engage in such screening. The purpose of § 3604(c) of the Fair 
Housing Act was to mitigate the harmful psychological effects of 
racism and frustrate the efforts of those seeking to discriminate against 
the protected classes of persons in the sale or rent of housing.  
The court’s interpretation frustrates the purpose of the Fair 
Housing Act by turning the internet into an arena for discriminatory 
housing advertisements by providing the websites that host them civil 
immunity. Furthermore, the court’s interpretation runs counter to the 
purpose of the Communications Decency act because it provides a 
disincentive for websites, like Craigslist, to screen illegal content, such 
as discriminatory housing advertisement, from their websites. Thus, 
under the court’s interpretation of the Communications Decency Act, 
neither statute’s purpose is fulfilled.  
In contrast, CLCCRUL’s proposed interpretation of the 
Communications Decency Act fulfils the purposes of both statutes. 
The CLCCRUL’s interpretation provides that unless an interactive 
computer service provider uses some form of screening, it has no 
immunity.154 This interpretation fulfills the purpose of the 
Communications Decency Act because it encourages interactive 
computer service providers to screen inappropriate and illegal content 
by rewarding them with immunity from civil liability. Furthermore, 
the CLCCRUL’s interpretation allows the purpose of the Fair Housing 
                                                 
154 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669. 
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Act to be carried out by not frustrating its current state of universal 
applicability.155 In contrast, the court’s interpretation of the 
Communications Decency Act tramples upon the rights guaranteed by 
the Fair Housing Act by exempting interactive computer service 
providers which make up a large and rapidly growing segment of the 
market for housing advertisement. Therefore, because the court’s 
interpretation is not necessary, and in fact contrary, to achieving the 
purpose of the Communications Decency Act, the court’s 
interpretation should have been rejected in favor of CLCCRUL’s 
interpretation which suffers from neither of these deficiencies. 
As this section demonstrates, the textual construction of the 
Communications Decency Act, its legislative history, and even the 
admission of Chief Judge Easterbrook reveal that Congress had no 
intention of making it an end-run around liability under the Fair 
Housing Act’s provision against publishing discriminatory 
advertisements. And even if one should feel so strongly about the 
single canon of statutory interpretation utilized by the court that one 
thinks it should prevail over the several other more applicable canons 
listed above, it should be remembered that “a thing may be within the 
letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute, because it is not 
within its spirit, nor the intention of its makers.”156 Although there are 
those that would disagree with this axiomatic principal, we would be 
remiss to follow their lead and suffer such absurd and painful results 
as those that will be discussed in Section IV below.  
 
B. Alternative theories for liability under the Fair Housing Act 
 
1. The Scope of the Fair Housing Act 
 
The Craigslist court held that the Communications Decency Act 
provided Craigslist civil immunity from being treated as the 
                                                 
155 However, because intent is not necessary for liability under the Fair 
Housing Act, this too could be seen as a restriction on the Fair Housing Act’s reach.  
156 Holy Trinity Church v. United States , 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
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“publisher” or “speaker” of user provided content.157 The court then 
swiftly, and without justification, declared that only “as [a] publisher 
could Craigslist be liable” under the Fair Housing Act.158 However, as 
this section demonstrates, the court drew a hasty conclusion. 
The Fair Housing Act’s ban on discriminatory advertisements, 
notices, and statements is broad.159 It covers not only those who 
publish discriminatory advertisements, notices, and statements, but 
also those who print them, make them, or cause them to be made, 
printed, or published.160 It is a well known canon of statutory 
interpretation that each phrase in a statute must, if possible, be given 
effect.161 Furthermore, another well-settled canon of statutory 
interpretation states that courts should avoid interpreting a provision in 
a manner that renders other provisions superfluous.162 Thus, although 
the actions prohibited by the Fair Housing Act may seem almost 
indiscernible at first glance, it is important that each word be 
interpreted to give effect to its inherently distinct meaning.  
Perhaps the most highly litigated action prohibited under 
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act is publishing. In 1968, when the 
Fair Housing Act was passed, the word publish meant “[t]o make 
public; to circulate; to make known to the people in general.”163 In the 
instant case, the discriminatory advertisements were made public by 
Craigslist posting them on their website. However, under the court’s 
interpretation of the Communications Decency Act, an interactive 
computer service provider is precluded from civil liability for 
publishing third-party content. Thus, if one accepts the court’s 
interpretation, Craigslist is immune for its activities as a publisher. 
 Section 3604(c) also makes it illegal to print discriminatory 
advertisements. As the district court pointed out in Craigslist, when 
                                                 
157 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671. 
158 Id. 
159 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1972). 
160 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000). 
161 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955). 
162 Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 529 U.S. 202, 208-209 (1997). 
163  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (Revised 4th ed. 1968). 
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the drafter’s of the Fair Housing Act passed the bill in 1968, to print 
meant simply to “[t]o stamp by direct pressure as from the face of 
types, plates, or blocks covered with ink or pigments, or to impress 
with transferred characters or delineations by the exercise of force as 
with a press or other mechanical agency.”164 The Communications 
Decency Act is silent regarding interactive computer service provider 
immunity for “printing.” Nonetheless, Craigslist’s actions do not fit 
the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition because creating a computer file 
and placing it on a server is highly dissimilar to applying ink to paper. 
Thus, Craigslist could not be held liable under this part of § 3604(c).  
 Furthermore, the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to cause a 
discriminatory advertisement to be made, printed, or published. In 
1968, the word cause meant to be the occasion of or “to effect as an 
agent”165 The Craigslist court rejected the claim that Craigslist could 
be liable for causing the advertisements to be made, printed, or 
published.166 The court stated that, “causation in a statute such as 
§ 3604(c) must refer to causing a particular statement to be made or 
perhaps the discriminatory content of a statement.”167 Other courts 
have interpreted causation under § 3604(c) in a similar manner. In 
Hunter, the Fourth Circuit stated that “in the context of classified real 
estate advertising, landlords and brokers ‘cause’ advertisements to be 
printed or published.”168 Craigslist played no such role in the creation 
of the discriminatory advertisements posted on its website. As the 
Craigslist court correctly pointed out, “nothing in the service craigslist 
offers induces anyone to. . .express a preference for discrimination.”169 
Thus, although the Communications Decency Act is silent regarding 
liability for causing something to be made, printed, or published, 
                                                 
164 Id. at 1457. 
165 Id. at 278. 
166 Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008). 
167 Id. at 671 
168 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1972). 
169 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671. 
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Craigslist was correctly found not liable under this part of § 3604(c) of 
the Fair Housing Act. 
  Finally, § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to make 
any discriminatory notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to 
the sale or rental of housing. In 1968, the common definition of the 
word make was “to cause to exist. . .[t]o form, fashion, or produce”170 
Under the court’s interpretation of the Communications Decency Act, 
an interactive computer service provider is immune from being treated 
as a speaker for the purposes of civil liability. The ordinary meaning of 
the verb to speak is “to communicate. . .by talking”171 Thus, an 
interactive computer service provider cannot be held liable under 
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act for making any orally 
communicated statements. However, this immunity does not preclude 
an interactive computer service provider, such as Craigslist, from 
being found liable under § 3604(c) for making a discriminatory non-
verbal advertisement or notice. The following section argues that 
Craigslist made the discriminatory housing advertisements complained 
about in Craigslist. Thus, the court should have held that Craigslist 
was liable under § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act. 
 
2. Liability for Making Discriminatory Advertisements 
 
The Fair Housing Act provides that it is a violation of the act to 
“make. . .any notice, statement, or advertisement. . .that indicates any 
preference, limitation, or discrimination” in the sale or lease of 
housing.172 The common definition of the word make is “to cause to 
exist. . .[t]o form, fashion, or produce.”173 This section demonstrates 
that the allegedly discriminatory advertisements at issue in Craigslist 
were computer files that were made exclusively by Craigslist. Thus, 
the court should have held Craigslist liable under the Fair Housing 
                                                 
170 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1107  (Revised 4th ed. 1968). 
171 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 566 (1990).  
172 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000). 
173 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (Revised 4th ed. 1968). 
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Act’s prohibition against making discriminatory housing 
advertisements. 
The process of a Craigslist posting begins by a user accessing a 
form on Craigslist’s website (“File 1”) designed to accept from the 
user, among other things, a description of the housing the user seeks to 
sell or rent, the asking price, and the location. Upon submitting the 
information, the content that the user provided is sent to a web server. 
When the information is at the web server, it is analyzed and 
reformatted by a computer program. Subsequently, a new file (“File 
2”) is created that contains the users input along with Craigslist’s 
signature look, feel, and added features. File 2 is then placed on 
Craigslist’s website to be viewed by the website’s future visitors. 
Additionally, a hyperlink is created on another webpage that is used as 
a reference to access and view that file.174  
The discriminatory advertisements at issue in Craigslist were not 
the File 1 type. Although each visitor provided in File 1 the inspiration 
for the contents of File 2, it cannot be said that any Craigslist user 
made the resulting file. The following two scenarios illustrate this 
point. 
Consider the process of a person purchasing a housing 
advertisement in the local newspaper. The person drives to the 
newspapers office, fills out a form with information to assist the 
newspaper in creating the advertisement, and hands the piece of paper 
to an employee of the newspaper. The employee then takes the 
customer’s input and creates an advertisement fit for publication. The 
next day, the paper is distributed to its subscribers, complete with the 
advertisement purchased by the customer.  
Contrast this situation with a person who attempts to sell their 
home by posting a notice on a public bulletin board. The person 
simply writes the pertinent information on a piece of paper and places 
the paper on the board. No other actors are required to create the 
advertisement because the piece of paper is the end product.  
                                                 
174 For an overview of HTML programming and website design, see generally 
Todd Stauffer, Absolute Beginner's Guide to Creating Web Pages (Que Publishing 
2003).   
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In the first scenario, it cannot be said that the advertisement was 
made by anyone but the newspaper company. Although the person 
provided input by filling out the form, that form is a completely 
distinct object from the resulting advertisement. The customer had no 
role in purchasing the materials, formatting the information, 
instructing the printer, or any other activity associated with creating 
the newspaper. Simply put, but for the newspaper’s efforts, the form 
would simply be a form, not an advertisement in the newspaper.  Thus, 
if the advertisement contained a discriminatory message, it would be 
proper to hold the newspaper company liable under the Fair Housing 
Act’s prohibition against making discriminatory advertisements.  
Conversely, the advertisement placed on the bulletin board was 
created by the person who placed it there. The bulletin board had no 
capacity to reformat or otherwise alter the piece of paper; the 
advertisement was solely the product of the person’s own efforts. 
Thus, if the piece of paper contained a discriminatory message, the 
person who posted it would be liable under the Fair Housing Act’s 
prohibition against making discriminatory advertisements.  
Craigslist is analogous to the newspaper company. Like the 
newspaper company, Craigslist offered a place for user input, 
processed the input, and, unlike the bulletin board, created a new 
product. Furthermore, the new product in both of these situations 
would not have been created, but for the efforts of the respective 
services. Analogous to the newspaper office being closed, if the server 
containing Craigslist’s formatting program was down, the resulting 
advertisement could not have been made.  
The Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “make. . .any notice, 
statement, or advertisement” that contains a discriminatory message. 
Each of these words should be presumed to not be redundant. In 
Craigslist, it is clear that by inputting a discriminatory message into 
the website form, the user made a discriminatory statement. However, 
as demonstrated above, this form was not the advertisement. The 
advertisement, albeit containing the statement provided by the user, 
was made by the computer program on Craigslist’s servers that was 
programmed to create a Craigslist advertisement with Craigslist’s 
signature look, feel, and added features.  
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Furthermore, it is pertinent to note the distinction between 
Craigslist’s role as a publisher and as a maker of the allegedly 
discriminatory advertisements at issue in Craigslist. As noted above, 
Craigslist made175 the advertisements when Craigslist’s computer 
program took the users input and created File 2. However, Craigslist 
did not publish176 File 2 until it placed it on its web space to be viewed 
by the public. This distinction is crucial because although the court’s 
interpretation of the Communications Decency Act provides civil 
immunity for interactive computer service providers from being 
treated as a publisher or speaker, the Act provides no such immunity 
for those who make a discriminatory advertisement.177 Therefore, the 
Craigslist court erred by not holding Craigslist liable under the Fair 
Housing Act’s Ban on making discriminatory advertisements. 
 
IV. THE CRAIGSLIST COURT WAS INCORRECT TO IMPLY THAT PUBLIC 
POLICY DICTATES THAT INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICE PROVIDERS 
SHOULD BE AFFORDED IMMUNITY. 
 
In Craigslist, Chief Judge Easterbrook spent a substantial portion 
of the opinion providing dictum on the public policy reasons for 
                                                 
175 When the Fair Housing Act was passed, the word make meant “[T]o cause 
to exist. . .[t]o form, fashion, or produce.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 
(Revised 4th ed. 1968). 
176 When the Fair Housing Act was passed, the word publish meant “[t]o make 
public; to circulate; to make known to the people in general.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1297 (Revised 4th ed. 1968).. 
177 In Tyus v. Robin Constr. Corp., the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois rejected an agency's argument that it could not be held 
liable under § 3604(c) because it did not publish the advertisements in question. 
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2791, *9-*10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1993). The court held that 
although the advertising agency was not the publisher of the advertisements, it was 
still liable because creating the advertisements fell “within the ambit of the statute.” 
Id. at *9. The court explained that § 3604(c) “does not limit liability only to those 
who publish an advertisement. That provision also expressly imposes liability on 
those who ‘make. . .any advertisement. . .that indicates any preference. . .based on 
race, [or] color.’" Id. 
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absolving Craigslist of liability as a publisher or speaker.178 This 
section argues that interactive computer service providers require no 
such special treatment.  
The Craigslist court began its policy analysis by implying that 
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act may violate the Free Speech 
Clause179 of the First Amendment regardless of the publishing 
medium.180 The court noted that single-family homes sold or rented by 
an owner who does not own more than three single-family homes are 
exempted from the Fair Housing Acts ban on discriminating in the sale 
or purchase of a home.181 However, § 3604(c)’s ban on discriminatory 
advertising still applies in these situations. The court found this 
problematic; it stated that “any rule that forbids truthful advertising of 
a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters serious 
problems under the first amendment.”182 However, despite the 
Craigslist court’s warning, courts have consistently held that although 
these types of landlords “are legally permitted to discriminate in the 
sale or rental of housing [they still] may not advertise their intention to 
do so.”183 Moreover, it is well settled law that there is no disruption of 
the traditional role of the free press by the prohibition of the 
publication of discriminatory advertisements.184 Thus, the Fair 
Housing Act’s prohibition against discriminatory advertisement is 
likely not problematic under the First Amendment.  
The Craigslist court further argued that the screening of user-
generated content would be prohibitively difficult for interactive 
computer service providers.185 The court posited that a simple filter 
                                                 
178 Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2008). 
179 The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that “Congress shall make 
no law. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend.. I. 
180 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668. 
181 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (2000). 
182 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668. 
183 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 1972). 
184 Id. at 212-13. 
185 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668-669. 
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that blocks words such as “white” would not work because the filter 
would block neutral sentences such as: “‘red brick house with white 
trim.’”186 The court also posited that human filterers may be equally 
poor at determining whether or not some advertisements are 
discriminatory.187 One of the advertisements complained about in 
Craigslist read, “’Catholic Church and beautiful Buddhist Temple 
within one block.”188 The court held that one could interpret this in a 
discriminatory as well as a harmless manner.189  
Although screening advertisements for discriminatory messages 
requires significant effort, requiring interactive computer service 
providers to do so is not unreasonable. In fact, the Fourth Circuit has 
gone so far to say that a publisher can “easily distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible advertisements in discharging its duty 
to reject those that violate § 3604(c).”190 Furthermore, courts have 
required virtually every other conceivable medium of expression to 
engage in screening for § 3604(c) violations.191 Interactive computer 
service providers should not be allowed a free pass simply because 
they generally receive higher volumes of advertisement submissions. 
The drafter’s of the Fair Housing Act made it clear that they intended 
to “alter the whole character of the housing market.”192 Thus, 
Congress certainly did not intend to bend the requirements of the Fair 
Housing Act whenever a company received too many requests for 
advertisements. 
Finally, the court argued that the high volume of submissions 
would require Craigslist to hire more staff and pass the added expense 
on to the consumer.193 The court is certainly correct that screening is 
expensive. However, this is a cost that newspapers and every other 
                                                 
186 Id. at 668. 
187 Id. at 669. 
188 Id. at 669. 
189 Id. 
190 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1972). 
191 Id. at 210-211. 
192 Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
193 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668-669. 
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publishing medium have bared since the Fair Housing Act was passed. 
For a newspaper to increase its volume, it must increase its staff. By 
exempting interactive computer service providers for § 3604(c)’s ban 
on discriminatory advertising, interactive computer service providers 
have been given a distinct and unjustified competitive advantage over 
their competitors that use other publishing mediums. 
Although there is often reason to regulate market-based 
competition to protect a needy segment of the population, interactive 
computer service providers offering internet-based housing 
advertisements are not such entities. In the past decade, websites such 
as Craigslist have become a dominant force in the housing classified 
market. In 2000, online classified advertisement revenue totaled just 
over $500,000 million.194 By 2006, that figure shot up to an 
astonishing $3.1 billion. No small player in the market, Craigslist is 
estimated to top $80 million in revenue in 2008 and would “easily” be 
able to make over $200 million per year with minor changes to its 
pricing structure.195 
Furthermore, any advantage awarded to interactive computer 
service providers further handicaps the greatly imperiled newspaper 
industry.196 Typically, a newspaper derives eighty percent of its 
revenue from advertising.197 Since online classified advertisements 
have entered the market, stock prices of newspapers have tumbled and 
many papers have been forced to go out of business.198  
                                                 
194 See, Diaz, supra note 26. 
195 Elinor Mills, Report estimates Craigslist 2008 revenue at $80 million (April 
3, 2008) , http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9911097-7.html. 
196 HELEN THOMAS, WATCHDOGS OF DEMOCRACY? THE WANING 
WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS AND HOW IT HAS FAILED THE PUBLIC 113 (Scribner 
2006) (noting that even industry moguls such as Warren Buffett, whose company 
owns an 18 percent interest in the Washington Post Company, predicted that the 
economic health of newspapers is deteriorating). 
197 Richard Pérez-Peña, Shrinking Ad Revenue Realigns U.S. Newspaper 
Industry INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 7, 2008, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/07/business/paper.php. 
198 Sarah Rabil, Newspapers Axe Monday Issues on Paper Cost, Ad Slump 
BLOOMBERG Oct. 13, 2008, 
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Whether print media should be saved or should be left to die by 
the invisible hand of the market is beyond the scope of this Note. It is 
sufficient to point out, as detailed above in this section, that the court 
proffered no substantial justification for providing interactive service 
providers with special privileges not enjoyed by any other mediums of 
expression. Thus, absent a compelling justification not identified in 
Craigslist, public policy dictates that interactive computer service 
providers should be held to the same standard under the Fair Housing 




 In 1968, the country was forever changed when Congress passed 
the Fair Housing Act. At that moment in time, Congress demonstrated 
to the entire nation that it was committed to a future wherein all 
citizens would be able to experience discrimination free housing 
opportunities. Acknowledging the harmful psychological effects of 
public displays of discrimination, Congress included in the Fair 
Housing Act a strong and thorough ban on the dissemination of any 
type of discriminatory message in the sale of lease of real property. 
This ban remained complete until it was fragmented by courts 
interpreting the Communications Decency Act to provide interactive 
computer service providers with civil immunity from being treated as 
a publisher or speaker of third-party content.  
  In Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit was presented with an 
opportunity to correct the prevailing misinterpretation of the 
Communications Decency Act, but balked at the invitation. As this 
Note demonstrates, the textual construction and the legislative history 
of the Communications Decency Act both favor an interpretation of 
§ 230(c)(1) that an interactive computer service provider should be 
afforded immunity as a publisher or speaker of third-party content 
only when it fulfills its duty to screen its service for inappropriate and 
illegal content. Furthermore, notwithstanding the immunity offered by 
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192 
the Communications Decency Act, Craigslist should have been found 
liable under the Fair Housing Act’s ban on making discriminatory 
advertisements.  
 Although Congress never contemplated the effect of the 
Communications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act, the continuing 
debate over the proper interpretation of the Communications Decency 
Act has put the onus on Congress to take a side. Consistent with the 
arguments of this Note, Congress should amend the Communications 
Decency Act to explicitly state that an interactive computer service 
provider cannot be held civilly liable under § 3604(c) of the Fair 
Housing Act for printing, publishing, or making a discriminatory 
notice, advertisement or statement only when it engages in the good 
faith screening of third-party content posted on its services. 
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